Indicators of social cohesion: Hungary from comparative perspectives

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Aim and course of the presentation

• Primary aim: to set up a causal model to test
  – But this is not actual test of the model: it is rather to highlight some elements of it.

• Course:
  – Definition of social cohesion
  – Determinants of social cohesion, an analytical framework – TODO: a model to test later on
  – Elements of model
    • Party system
    • Political cleavages (socio-economic and cultural differences that fundamentally determine political competition in a party system)
    • Policy performance: quality of governance
    • Generalized trust
    • Institutional trust and satisfaction
    • Socio-political attitudes
    • Social capital
  – A so called 'conclusion'
    • How to form a cohesive society?
    • How to change social capital regime?
## Meaning of social cohesion*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimension</th>
<th>Lack of cohesion</th>
<th>Cohesion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Socio-economic structure</td>
<td>Economic distances, income inequalities</td>
<td>Legitimacy of social differentials, mobility, transparency, acceptance of the rules of games</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Culture (values and opinions)</td>
<td>Value homogeneity, intolerance</td>
<td>Multiple group identification, general norm obedience, tolerance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutions (Relationship to public institutions)</td>
<td>Subordination, distrust</td>
<td>Citizens' active participation, trust in public institutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social capital (Relationship between citizens, network)</td>
<td>Closed hierarchical links (network homophily) Nepotism, clientism, lack of generalized trust</td>
<td>Dense networks, network heterophily, active social embeddness, generalized trust in others</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Based on Tóth, 2012*
## Meaning of Social Cohesion (continued)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Domain</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) Common values and a civic culture</td>
<td>Common aims and objectives; Common moral principles; Support for political institutions and participation in politics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Social order and social control</td>
<td>Absence of general conflict and threats to the existing order; Effective informal social control; Tolerance and respect for difference; Inter-group co-operation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) Social solidarity and reductions in wealth disparities</td>
<td>Harmonious economic and social development and common standards; Redistribution of public finances and of opportunities; Equal access to services and welfare benefits; Ready acknowledgement of social obligations and willingness to assist others</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4) Social networks and social capital</td>
<td>High degree of social interaction within communities and families; Civic engagement and associational activity; Easy resolution of collective action problems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5) Place attachment and identity</td>
<td>Strong attachment to place; Intertwining of personal and place identity</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

But fortunately Council of Europe

- Has a Directorate General of Social Cohesion:
  - According to them social cohesion is a concept “that includes values and principles which aim to ensure that all citizens, without discrimination and on equal footing, have access to fundamental social and economic rights. Social cohesion is a flagship concept which constantly remind us of the need to be collectively attentive to, and aware of, any kind of discrimination, inequality, marginality or exclusion.”
  - “The Council of Europe does not see social cohesion as being a homogenising concept that is only based on traditional forms of social integration, which nonetheless are important, such as identity, the sharing of the same culture, adhering to the same values. It is a concept for an open and multicultural society.”* (Emphasis added by the author)

* Quoted by Jane Jenson (2010)
Determinants of social cohesion

Political fragmentation (cleavages) → Party system → Performance: quality of governance

Socio-political attitudes → Institutional trust → Generalized trust

Social capital regime → Social cohesion

Model
Cleavages and party system

- Political fragmentation (cleavages)
- Party system
  - Performance: quality of governance
- Socio-political attitudes
- Institutional trust
  - Generalized trust
- Social capital regime
  - Social cohesion
Concentrated party system: low effective number of parliamentary parties (ENPP)

* Source: Own calculation. #

** Jungerstam-Mulders, 2006.#

# ENPPs are calculated according to the Laakso and Taagepera (1979) formula
High level of left-right polarization and growing right-wing identification

Average left-right scale scores on 0-10 scale in selected countries, 2002-2010*

- Austria
- Czech Republic
- Germany
- Hungary
- Poland
- Slovakia

Left-right identification in Hungary, 2003-2010 (means on 1-10 scale)**

* Source: European Social Survey Rounds 1-5

** Source: Hungarian Election Study Data
Low level of voters' volatility till 2010*

* Pedersen (1979) index values. Own calculations based on official election results.
Cleavage structure (pre 2010)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Left</th>
<th>Right</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Territorial</td>
<td>Budapest and urban</td>
<td>Country and rural</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age*</td>
<td>Older</td>
<td>Younger</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political class / Attitude toward pre 1990 system (Körösényi, 1996)</td>
<td>Nomenclature / More tolerance toward happiest barrack</td>
<td>Non or less integrated groups / anti-communist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identity</td>
<td>European / Cosmopolitan</td>
<td>National</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion</td>
<td>Secularized</td>
<td>Religious</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Traditional left-right value dimensions – like attitude to inequality and role of government have been melted. cf. Fábián-Tóth, 2008.)
Characteristics of the Hungarian Party System

- Concentrated party system – Low effective number of parties
- High level of left-right polarization
- High level of partisanship (Tóka, 2006)
- Electoral blocs formation → Network homophily in political communication (e.g., Angelusz and Tardos, 2011)
- Camps are socially embedded ← Cleavage structure
- Low volatility, constant players till 2010
- Political realignment – Critical election in 2010
  - New players: Extreme right (Jobbik) – Greens (LMP)
  - Absolute, two-third majority to Centre Right party alliance
  - Fragmented left-wing opposition
  - Extreme right competitor for Fidesz-KDNP
Performance: quality of governance

Political fragmentation (cleavages)

Party system

Performance: quality of governance

Socio-political attitudes

Institutional trust

Generalized trust

Social capital regime

Social cohesion

Three basic indicators to show how Hungary missed the opportunity to be forerunner in the region and the basis of population's frustration in Hungary.

GDP
PC income
Inequality
GDP per capita in Purchasing Power Standards (PPS) (EU-27=100) in Hungary, Slovakia and Poland (1995-2011)*

Performance: quality of gov.

* Source: Eurostat.
Income and income inequality*

* Source: KSH Stadat tables (3.1.13) and Tóth 2009.
Notes: Income is per capita real income (1990=100), inequality is equalized Gini and 1987=100. The actual Gini value was 0.236 in 1987.
Institutional trust is very much dependent on political climate and performance of public institutions. Generalized trust is the results of socialization (family) and broader context of social capital. It is relatively stable over time, but institutional and performance factors may also have effect on it.
Generalized trust 2010*

* Source: ESS 5. round.
Generalized trust in selected countries, 2002-2010*

* Source: ESS 1-5 rounds. Interactive chart: http://www.tarki.hu/maps/blog/trust-trends-updated
Trust in the legal system, 2002-2010*

* Source: ESS 1-5 rounds. Means on 0-10 scales. Interactive chart: http://www.tarki.hu/maps/blog/trust-trends-updated
Trust in parliament, 2002-2010*

Satisfaction with democracy, 2002-2010*

* Source: ESS 1-5 rounds. Means on 0-10 scales. Interactive chart: http://www.tarki.hu/maps/blog/trust-trends-updated
Socio-political attitudes: tolerance and demand for redistribution

Political fragmentation (cleavages)

Party system

Performance: quality of governance

Socio-political attitudes

Institutional trust

Generalized trust

Social capital regime

Social cohesion
Percent of those who would not allow immigrants of different race to come and live, 2002-2010*

* Source: ESS 1-5 rounds. Means on 0-10 scales. Interactive chart: http://www.tarki.hu/maps/blog/trust-trends-updated
Percent of those who “strongly agree” with the statement that “income differences are too high” in selected countries, 1987-2009*

* Source: ISSP Social Inequality.
Socio-political attitudes

Percent of those who “strongly agree” with the statement that “government should reduce income differences” in selected countries, 1987-2009*

* Source: ISSP Social Inequality.
Social capital

Political fragmentation (cleavages)

Party system

Performance: quality of governance

Socio-political attitudes

Institutional trust

Generalized trust

Social capital regime

Social cohesion
Percentage of those who never meet friends, relatives or work colleagues by country*

* Source: European Social Survey 1-5 rounds.
Percent of those who worked in organisation or association (other than political parties) last 12 months by countries and ESS rounds*
Worked for association by educational attainment, Hungary 2010*

* Source: ESS 5. round.
## Turnout in parliamentary, local and EP elections in Hungary, 1990-2010*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Parliamentary elections (1st round)</th>
<th>Local election</th>
<th>European Parliamentary election</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>65.1</td>
<td>40.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>68.9</td>
<td>43.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>56.3</td>
<td>45.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>70.5</td>
<td>51.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>38.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>67.8</td>
<td>53.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>36.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>64.4</td>
<td>46.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Source: National Election Office (http://www.valasztas.hu)
# Instead of conclusion

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Element of the model</th>
<th>Findings and some recommendations to achieve more cohesive society</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) Party system</td>
<td>Too competitive / combatant, lack of consensual elements; need for political realignment and elite change.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Performance</td>
<td>Poor performance that have not meet popular expectations; need for change of political culture / political elite ???</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) Socio-political attitudes</td>
<td>Intolerance, high expectation toward the state and public services; Generational shift and cultural change resulted from good governance and performance of public institutions possibly could alter path dependencies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4) Institutional trust</td>
<td>Dependent on political cycles, it can be recovered throughout good governance; need for political and cultural change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5) Generalized trust</td>
<td>It is the hardest to change, but should follow the pattern of social capital regime.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
“Happy endings must come at the end of something,' the Walrus pointed out. 'If they happen in the middle of a story, or an adventure, or the like, all they do is cheer things up for awhile.”*

(6) On observed low and over-politicized social capital regime a quote from Pichler and Wallace (2007) can be concluding**: “In countries where family or informal social capital predominate to a much greater extent it may be more difficult to establish a vibrant civil society of the kind described by Putnam because the culture does not allow it. Yet societies change. As civil society is rekindled in Southern and Eastern Europe, we might find new forms of social cohesion emerging.”

References


